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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
plaintiff to establish the defendant's good faith or must the defendant's
insurer intervene 9 to prove that defendant changed his residence for
forum shopping purposes? What of the effect of the defendant's move
on his duty to cooperate with the insurer in the defense of the action?
What of the move's effect on the insurer's duty to defend and the con-
flict of interest problems inherent in the trial of such a case?
Considering the severe hardships occasionally wrought by statutory
limitations, it is not surprising that courts sometimes strain to avoid
enforcing them. However, the ruling in Miller that a post-accident
change of domicile is a relevant "contact" to be considered in choice of
law deliberations seems to have increased unnecessarily the difficulty
of determining prior to litigation what law governs a Miller-type case.
The court could have avoided the uncertainty likely to arise in future
cases by disregarding the post-accident change of domicile, finding
Maine law applicable under the Babcock test, and by reasserting the
validity of the Kilberg rule to defeat the statutory limitation.30 Al-
though the substance/procedure characterization is strained at best and
simply false at worst, nonetheless, use of the technique would accomp-
lish the same result as that reached in Miller, i.e., full compensation,
and at the same time it would increase predictability in future choice
of law cases. The forum shopping problem discussed in the dissent to
Miller would not be solved by applying the Kilberg doctrine. However,
it seems an inescapable fact of life today that, just as there are "good"
states in which to domicile a corporation,"' so there are "good" states
in which to be a personal injury plaintiff. Nothing short of a reversion
by all jurisdictions to the pre-Kilberg vested rights doctrine will stop
forum shopping in multi-state personal injury cases.3 2
CHARLES D. CLAUSEN
Poverty Law-King v. Smith and "Man-In-The-Home": The
Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children (AFDC) program
was established by the Social Security Act of 1935.' The program was
29 In a "direct action" state, the insurer would be a party to the action from its
inception and would be in a position to present to the court the issue of
whether the insured changed his residence in order to expand his insurer's
liability.
30 The argument against applying the Kilberg rationale to a Miller fact situation,
made in note 27, supra, is useful only if the court should desire to limit lia-
bility. Since the court in Miller felt that the insurer was the real party in
interest, it was interested in extending liability rather than limiting it.
31 See Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of
1967, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 861 (1969).
32 See La Brum, The Fruits of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty, and
Forum Shopping, 54 A.B.A.J. 747 (1968).
1 The original program was known as "Aid to Dependent Children," under
Act of Aug. 15, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 627. This act was amended in 1962 by
Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, Title I, § 104(a) (4), (c) (2), 76
Stat. 185-6, and the name was changed to its present form. Hereinafter the
program will be referred to as AFDC.
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established "For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent
children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives[,} ... to help
maintain and strengthen family life and to help . . .parents or relatives
to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal
independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental
care and protection .... -2 Under this program, welfare assistance is
provided for the benefit of a dependent child "[W]ho has been deprived
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence
from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent .... "3 and
who lives with any one of a number of listed relatives. The Act also
provides for aid to dependent children of unemployed parents, although
states participating in AFDC generally are not compelled to participate
in this specific part of the program.
4
The program is financed by a matching of federal and state funds.
States are eligible to receive federal funds only after the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare has approved states' plans for the ad-
ministration of the program.5 Alabama participated in the program and
its plan was originally approved6 by the Secretary, but Alabama and
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare carried on a con-
tinuing correspondence concerning the conformity of the Alabama plan
to federal policies and requirements, starting as early as 1956.7 Certain
revisions of the Alabama plan were less than enthusiastically received
by the Department. In fact, the state was informed that some of its
policies were in direct conflict with the Social Security Act. One such
policy was in the form of a "substitute father" regulation.
The Social Security Act provides that:
A State plan" for aid and services to needy families with chil-
dren must... (7) ... provide that the State agency shall, in deter-
mining need, take into consideration any other income and re-
sources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with de-
pendent children... as well as any expenses reasonably attribut-
able to the earning of any such income .... 
Alabama had added a"man-in-the-home" (also known as a "substitute
father") regulation to its program. The regulation was used to cut off
aid to families receiving AFDC payments, on the theory that the re-
quirement of the father's absence from the home was no longer met.
2 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
3 42 U.S.C. § 606(a), as amended, (Supp. III, 1968).
4 42 U.S.C. § 607, as amended, (Supp. III, 1968).
5 Section 104(b) of Pub. L. 87-543 provided: "Each State plan approved under
title IV of the Social Security Act and in effect on the date of the enactment
of this Act shall be deemed for purposes of such title, without the necessity
of any change in such plan, to have been conformed with the amendments
made by subsection (a) of this section."
6 Id. Alabama's plan was automatically approved by the 1962 amendment.
7 Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31, 36-38 (D.C. Ala. 1967).842 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (1964) (emphasis added).
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Under the Alabama regulation, an able-bodied man, married or single,
was considered a substitute father of all the applicant mother's children
if one of three situations existed: (1) he lived in the mother's home
for the purpose of cohabitation; (2) he visited the home frequently
for the purpose of cohabitation; or (3) he cohabited with the mother
frequently outside the home.9 As can readily be seen, need was not
a factor to be considered when applying this regulation. A child who
was in all other respects eligible for assistance under the AFDC pro-
gram would no longer receive aid if his mother was having continuing
or frequent sexual relations with any man.
Mrs. Sylvester Smith, a widow and mother of four children, was
a resident of Dallas County, Alabama. The family had been receiving
aid under the AFDC program for several years. In the Fall of 1966 she
was informed that, in accordance with the state's substitute father
regulation, her name had been stricken from the list of those eligible
for assistance under the program. She had been charged with having
frequent sexual relations with a Mr. Williams. He was not the father
of any of Mrs. Smith's children and did not give any financial assistance
to Mrs. Smith or her family. As Mr. Williams was married and living
with his wife and eight children, he was in no position to provide the
Smith family with any financial aid. He never had been, nor was he
at any future time, willing or able to support the Smith family. Mrs.
Smith brought an action to have her family's AFDC assistance rein-
stated. Her action was based on two theories: that Alabama's interpre-
tation of who is a non-absent parent was not consistent with Subchapter
IV of the Social Security Act,10 and that such interpretation was not
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution."
At the outset, it might be questioned why Alabama received federal
funds when its plan was not in conformance with federal requirements.
The state had been informed as early as 1964 that its substitute father
regulation did not conform to the Social Security Act.1 This regulation
had been in effect since 196213 and, although never approved by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Alabama continued to
effectuate it. During this time Alabama continued to receive federal
funds in spite of the fact that the Social Security Act specifically pro-
vides for the termination of federal payments to a state when its plan
is so changed that it no longer conforms to the Act.14
9 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 314 (1968), citing the Alabama Manual for Ad-
ministration of Public Assistance, pt. I, ch. II, § VI.
LO King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311 (1968).
'1 Id.12Letter from the Atlanta Regional Director for the Department of Health,
Education and Wrelfare, Aug. 31, 1964. See Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31,
37 (D.C. Ala. 1967).13 See Appendix to Opinion of 'Mr. Justice Douglas, Concurring, King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 337 (1968).
1442 U.S.C. § 604(a) (2) (1964).
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The author of a recent article in the New York Times concluded
that the reason for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's
ineffectiveness was its "unwieldly" power. The Department could term-
inate payments to the states, but, short of this, it was powerless. The
blame for the Department's inaction was placed on Congress and its
political motivations 15 and while the author appears to have a very
cynical outlook as to the effectiveness of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare's ability to control the use of the funds it dis-
tributes to the states, it is questionable whether such a sweeping criti-
cism is valid. It fails to take into consideration that the Department,
as a federal agency, is somewhat influential. The power of reprisal re-
mains in the Department and, even though not exercised, must bring
pressure to bear on the states. This criticism, though, should not be
brushed aside without some thought. One must bear in mind that Ala-
bama retained its substitute father regulation for three years after it
had been informed of the regulation's inconsistency with the Social
Security Act and federal (Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare) policy.
The lower court found the regulation in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. While Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion agreed
with the lower court, the majority of the Supreme Court chose to base
its decision on statutory interpretation. Justice Douglas found three
reasons that were of such moment to him that he felt that the statutory
route did not adequately resolve the question. First, he pointed out that,
under the majority's decision, Alabama could simply reject federal funds
and reimpose the regulation under its own welfare statutes.s Then the
constitutional question would again arise under the state's own welfare
program. However, an attempt by Alabama to fund such a program on
its own would be more than ambitious and, therefore, highly unlikely.
An attempt of this nature would result in negligible payments to wel-
fare recipients or no welfare in this area at all.
Secondly, Justice Douglas felt that the only reason for the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare's rejection of the regulation
was that it extended to all of the mother's non-marital sexual relations,
rather than just to those in the home. This argument stems from the
so-called Flemming Rule of 1961 of the then Secretary of Health, Edu-.
cation and Welfare:
A state plan [for aid to dependent children] may not impose an
eligibility condition that would deny assistance with respect to
15 Goodman, The Case of Mrs. Sylvester Snith, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1968,(fagazine), at 67. "Even after the Smith Case was under way and the court
urged it to come forward, H.E.W. played a curiously coy part. The reasons,
one may fairly surmise, have to do with politics. In the best of times H.E.W.
is not a favored child of the Congress, and these are not the best of times
for domestic welfare-or for upsetting Southern legislators." Id.
Is King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 335 & n. 3 (1968).
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a needy child on the basis that home conditions in which the
child lives are unsuitable, while the child continues to reside in
the home. Assistance will therefore be continued during the time
efforts are being made either to improve the home conditions or
to make arrangements for the child elsewhere.'"
Justice Douglas felt that the Department differentiated between sexual
relationships within and without the home. Since he could see no distinc-
tion between the two in regard to the suitability of the home, he felt it
necessary to decide the question of whether AFDC payments must be
continued when the mother was carrying on such a relationship in the
home, as well as when this type of relationship existed outside the home.
Justice Douglas cites the lower court's opinion for authority that such
a distinction was made.' 8 At one point, the lower court cited some of
the correspondence between the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare and the state concerning Alabama's "suitable home" policies.
There appears to be scant evidence in the record to support Justice
Douglas' conclusion. One letter from the Department to the Alabama
authorities states:
[T]his amendment [discussing Alabama's then proposed "sub-
stitute father" regulation] goes far beyond your presently ap-
proved plan in that it results in ineligibility of all children living
in a home with a mother, if she cohabitats with a man who is not
her husband, or is illegitimately pregnant, or has given birth to
an illegitimate child within the preceding six months, irrespec-
tive of whether the man has any family relationship with the
mother and the child or children.19
This last clause would appear to lend some credence to Justice Douglas'
argument, but there is little more support to be found.
Finally, Justice Douglas argued that the decision should have been
based on constitutional grounds because of the "long-standing admini-
strative construction that approves state AFDC plans containing a man-
in-the-house provision.' 20 Such a construction, he argued, should be
accorded great weight in determining whether such man-in-the-home
regulations were indeed in conflict with federal policy. There seems to
be no doubt that this argument is valid if it is determined that all such
regulations in all forms are invalid. The majority, unlike Justice Doug-
las, was apparently not willing to come to this conclusion and, therefore,
did not want to lay down principles through which all such regulations
could be upset. For one thing, the Social Security Act itself provides
17 Id. at 322-23.
is Id. at 335. See also Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31, 36-38 (D.C. Ala. 1967).
'9 Letter from the Atlanta Regional Director for the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, Aug. 31, 1964 (emphasis added). See Smith v. King,
277 F. Supp. 31, 37 (D.C. Ala. 1967).
20 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968).
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for termination of aid where home conditions are unsuitable if other
adequate care and assistance is provided the child.
21
Assuming for the moment that the majority was wrong and that
the regulation was not in violation of the Social Security Act, the
question is reached as to whether Justice Douglas was correct in finding
the Alabama regulation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Justice Douglas pointed out that a child could not be denied a cause of
action merely because he was "conceived in sin," since such a disqualifi-
cation was discriminatory.22 He argued that the present case was analo-
gous, and concluded that the reasons stated in the lower court's opinion
were correct and that the lower court was right in basing its decision
on constitutional grounds.
The lower court had concluded that the Alabama regulation classi-
fied children in determining whether they were eligible for aid under
the AFDC program, and held that any " '[A]ttempted classification...
must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and
just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed,
and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis.' "23 It
further held that the denial of AFDC to otherwise eligible children on
the basis of their mother's immorality was "[A] reason . . . wholly un-
related to any purpose of the Aid to Dependent Children statutes. '24
The lower court therefore concluded that the regulation did violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
As was admitted by Justice Douglas, 25 the Court traditionally follows
the statutory route, rather than the constitutional one, unless statutory
construction makes the prior method impossible. There is in the opinion,
however, some indication of the majority's feelings as to whether
morality can be a string attached to welfare aid. The majority opinion
discussed the evolution of public welfare in regard to needy families
deprived of a male breadwinner.26 It was pointed out that the f ore-
runner of AFDC, the mother's pension welfare program, was charac-
terized by a "worthy person" concept. In other words, under this early
program those mothers who were considered immoral because of their
sexual behavior would have their welfare aid terminated. This policy,
the opinion stated, was a "significant characteristic of public welfare
programs during the last half of the 19th century in this country." 27
Looking to legislative history for authority, the Court then stated:
2142 U.S.C. § 608 (1964).
22 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 336 (1968).
23 Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31, 38 (D.C. Ala. 1967).
24 Id. at 39.
25 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 344 (1968), citing Harmon v. Bruckner
355 U.S. 579, 581 (1957).
26 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-27 (1968).
27 Id. at 321.
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In this social context it is not surprising that both the House
and Senate Committee Reports on the Social Security Act of
1935 indicate that States participating in AFDC were free to
impose eligibility requirements relating to the "moral character"
of applicants.
2
The opinion went on to discuss how, in the 1940's and 1950's, such
requirements lost favor in the eyes of many people and came under
repeated attack. The opinion also described gubernatorial reaction to
attempts by several state legislatures to disqualify illegitimate children
from AFDC and noted, too, the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare's strong disapproval of such a policy. Finally, the Court pointed
out that Congress, in 1962, approved the Flemming Ruling in statutory
form.29 From these observations it might be surmized that the majority
apparently felt that if morality was no longer a valid consideration in
the distribution of funds to welfare recipients it was up to Congress to
declare it.
In support of its argument that the congressional attitude toward
cutting off AFDC under a state regulation so constructed had changed,
the majority cited the many congressional amendments to the Social
Security Act. Recent amendments to the Act provided for the removal
of a child from a home that has been, through a judicial proceeding,
declared unsuitable, ° for the termination of AFDC if the child or chil-
dren are provided with other adequate care by the state,3 1 for programs
for improving unsuitable homes,32 for establishment of the paternity
of illegitimate children,3 3 and for voluntary family planning services .
4
The Court therefore concluded that this regulation was not a valid
method for discouraging illicit sexual relationships or illegitimate births,
both of which purposes the state had argued were valid grounds for
the regulation.
Alabama's second argument for the validity of the regulation was
that "'[T]here is a public interest in a State not undertaking the pay-
ment of these funds to families who because of their living arrange-
ments would be in the same situation as if the parents were married,
except for the marriage.' "35 In the latter situation, the children would
not be eligible for AFDC because their father lived in the home. In the
former, the children would be eligible even though a man lived in the
home, the difference between the two situations being only an actual
marriage. The majority's response to this argument was simply that,
28Id. at 321.
29 Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 64, 75 Stat. 77.
30 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (1) (1964).
3142 U.S.C. § 604(b) as amended, (Supp. III, 1968).
3242 U.S.C. § 602(a) as amnended, (Supp. III, 1968).
3 Id.
34 Id.
35 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 327 (1968).
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where a marriage had taken place, the father was legally obligated to
care for his children. In the other case, the man was not under any
legal obligation to support the children, unless, of course, a child was
in fact his or he had assumed the responsibility for a child's support
through adoption. The majority had pointed out earlier 36 that, under
Alabama statutes, the legal obligation for support was imposed only upon
a parent of a child,37 and Alabama case law3 8 has interpreted such
statutes to mean that only a person, not in fact the child's parent, who
voluntarily assumes the obligation for support will be required to do so.
However, the Alabama court has held that this voluntary assumption
"should not be slightly nor hastily inferred."3 9
The majority contended that the word "parent," as used in section
606(a) of the Act,40 meant only a person legally obligated to support
the child and that this was what Congress intended when it passed the
Act. In support of this interpretation, the majority cited the word's
use in other parts of the Act41 and the legislative history of its pass-
age. 42 It may appear that the majority ran into a consistency problem
at this juncture. Earlier, it was pointed out that Congress, when it
passed the Social Security Act in 1935, allowed states to set up plans
to deprive certain children of aid under the Act.43 The majority then
cited Senate and House committee reports, made at the time of the
Act's passage, in support of the propostion that Congress could not
have intended to discriminate against a certain group of children in
the dispensing of welfare aid. The majority confused the explanation
by stating, "By a parity of reasoning, we think that Congress must have
intended that the children in such a situation remain eligible for AFDC
assistance notwithstanding their mother's impropriety." 44 This state-
ment seems to be diametrically opposed to the majority's earlier state-
ment that Congress would allow eligibility requirements based on the
morality of the applicant. The majority correctly stated that the Act
was designed to benefit children who have been deprived of a wage
earner, or "breadwinner," because other programs were set up for
children who had unemployed parents.45 The court was correct in
stating that the term "parent," as used in the Act, means a person legally
obligated to give support. Whether Congress would allow morality to
30 Id. at 326, n.10.3 7AALA. CODE title 34, § 90 (Supp. 1965). Section 89 of this title defines the term
"parent" as "[T]he natural legal parent or parents, or other persons who shall
have legally acquired the custody of such child or children, and the father of
such child or children, though born out of wedlock."3sLaw v. State, 238 Ala. 428, 199 So. 803 (1939).
s Englehardt v. Yung's Heirs, 76 Ala. 534, 540 (1884).
4042 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964).
41 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See the Court's discussion at 331-32.
421d. at 327-29.
4 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See the Court's discussion at 320-22.
44M. at 329.
45 Id. at 328-30.
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be an eligibility requirement is immaterial. The Act was still intended
to benefit children deprived of parental support. The eligibility require-
ment was after the fact, so to speak. Congress did allow such an eligi-
bility requirement, but, as was pointed out earlier in the opinion, through
various amendments to the Act had outlawed such a requirement. The
majority's ultimate conclusion was correct, but its reasoning was spuri-
ous. However, the majority then went on to cite later congressional
amendments to the Act which concern the finding of the child's father
and securing support for the child from him in an attempt to buoy its
interpretation of the term "parent." Its reasoning in this respect stands
on firmer ground. The majority argued that the "parent," as used in
these amendments, when dead or missing, was the same "parent" that
Congress was interested in when determining whether a child fit into
the category eligible for aid under the Act. In sum, what is confusing
or illogical is that Congress allowed morality to be an eligibility re-
quirement under the Act in 1935. Such a requirement was a direct con-
tradiction to the system it had set up.
King v. Smith appears to indicate a trend toward a more restrictive
viewpoint as to factors other than need and such factors' relation to
welfare programs. However, the majority opinion indicated that this
is a congressional trend, thereby implying that Congress may attach
whatever strings it wishes to welfare aid and that the courts will not
interfere. But it should be remembered that the majority did not reach
the constitutional issue and did not say that such regulations are not
unconstitutional. One possible reason for this could be that the Court
may have been trying to stay out of the administrative affairs of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and to not embarrass
it by revealing its ineffectiveness in keeping the states in line with its
policies. It remains to be seen how the states with substitute father
regulations will react.46 It is certain that if these regulations are kept
intact, more cases like King will arise, but it seems apparent from this
46 It should be noted that several points are not covered by this decision. In an
article in 14 WELFARE L. BULL. 19 (Sept., 1968) Ronald Pollack, a Staff
Lawyer at the Columbia Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, points
out that twelve states have "budgetary rules" rather than man-in-the-home
regulations. A rule of this nature is used by a state to establish a "rebuttable
presumption of income availability" to a child "based on the presence of a
man-in-the-home." 14 WELFARE L. BULL. 19, 21 (Sept., 1968). King v. Smith
does not concern such rules. However, Mr. Pollack points out that the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare has since outlawed budgetary
rules, although he expresses some fear that states will continue to implement
them until forced to submit to federal policy
A further problem concerns the retroactive effect of this decision. The
Department has ruled that corrective payments will be made retroactively to
June 17, 1968, the date of the Supreme Court's decision in King v. Smith.
State Letter No. 1048 (Sept. 30, 1968). See 14 WELFARE L. BULL. 19, 20
(Sept., 1968). The Department has also agreed in court not to seek overpay-
ments made to persons who received aid while such persons violated man-in-
the-house regulations. Matter of Janetta W., No. 872-020.0 (D.C. fair hear-
ing, decided Oct. 7, 1968). See 15 WELFARE L. BULL. 6 (Dec., 1968).
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case that any such regulation will have to provide for some method
of assisting needy children before it will be allowed. The important
point to remember here is that AFDC is intended to benefit children
and not the children's mothers. Any regulation which terminates this
aid for a reason other than need or act of the individual child himself
would be wholly illogical unless the child is provided for in some other
manner. The majority opinion is restricted to the issue of a mother's
immorality in respect to the termination of aid. Although Justice
Douglas' opinion was broader than necessary for a determination of
this case, his argument is appealing and may be important in future
problems in this area. WILLIAM CROKE
Torts: Negligence-Policeman In Performance of Duties
Allowed Recovery As Invitee: In Cameron v. Abatiell' a city police-
man was injured when steps leading to the back door of a business
building collapsed while he was following his usual routine of checking
for fires. The Vermont Court, in determining the liability of the owner,
was concerned with the status of a policeman rightfully on the premises
in the performance of his duties. The court held that the policeman
was entitled to recover from the possessor of the premises, since he
enjoyed the status of a business invitee. The court stated:
In this case, as in cases of a public employee, the policeman
covering the Center Street beat could reasonably be anticipated
and expected not only as to time (in the evening after closing
hours) but also as to the exact place. Thus, the defendants had
a reasonable opportunity to make the premises safe or to warn
the plaintiff of any dangerous condition. It was within the
reasonable foresight of the .defendants of what was likely to
happen if the steps leading to the rear door became in disrepair.
The plaintiff was not using the stairway to the rear door in an
emergency in the discharge of his police duties. His entry on the
steps was not to make an arrest or chase a thief or burglar. The
circumstances of this case distinguish it from those cases arising
in other jurisdictions which deny recovery.
[W] e conclude that the relationship between the plaintiff and
defendants is in essence that of a business visitor, or invitee, on
the premises. Accordingly, the rules of protection from injury
applicable to such class of persons are controlling.2
However, the majority of American courts have classified police-
men entering premises in performance of their duties as mere licencees. 3
1241 Ad2d 310 (Vt. 1968).
2 Id. at 314-15.
3 See Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Griswold, 241 Ala. 104, 1 So. 2d 393 (1941);
Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho 227, 281 P. 371 (1929); Carroll v. Hemenway,
315 Mass. 45, 51 N.E2d 952 (1943) ; Scheurer v. Trustees of the Open Bible
Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38 (1963). See Note, 28 CORNELL L.Q.
232 (1943).
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